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Jurisdictional Statement 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4). The case was transfeiTed from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals. 
Statement of the Issue 
Did the trial court correctly determine that Judge Claudia Laycock was entitled to 
judicial immunity and that the Appellant's complaint did not, and could not, state facts 
showing that Judge Laycock's actions were outside the scope of judicial immunity? 
Statement of the Case 
The Appellee accepts the Appellant's recitation of the course of proceedings and 
disposition below. However, the Appellee disagrees with the Appellant's asserted 
"facts." The Appellee submits that many of the asserted facts are instead legal 
conclusions. The Appellee therefore provides the following facts: 
1. The Appellant Neldon P. Johnson is a party to a divorce case in the Fourth 
District Court, case no. 004401468. R. 1. 
2. Judge Claudia Laycock presided over the divorce case for a period of time. 
R. 1. 
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3. The Appellant Neldon P. Johnson filed a complaint against Judge Claudia 
Laycock on March 1. 2006. R. 1 - 4. The complaint is attached as Appendix "B" and 
speaks for itself as to its factual allegations. 
4. A motion to dismiss was filed by Judge Laycock. R. 12 - 18. The 
Appellant filed an Opposition. R. 19 - 27. The motion to dismiss was granted in an order 
dated May 30, 2006. R. 42 - 44. The Appellant is appealing that order. R. 45, 46. The 
order is attached as Appendix "A," 
5. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, conducted on May 5, 2006, the 
Appellant alleged facts in addition to those stated in the complaint. The Appellant 
alleged that Judge Laycock "was acting for [sic] counsel for . . . the opposing side." R. 
54, page 8, lines 22 - 24. 
6. The court then spent approximately 30 minutes exploring with Appellant 
the facts in support of this allegation. Portions of a transcript from the divorce court were 
read during the hearing. That transcript was not made a part of the record below. 
However, the following is an example of the discussion that occurred during the hearing 
in which portions of the transcript were read: 
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The Court: Well, I'm asking - - you told me, sir, that Judge Laycock said 
she could act as an attorney. I've read the record. She didn't say that. So what I 
want to know is first - -
Mr. N. Johnson: She - -
The Court: Just first - - you can go to your case law in a minute. 
Mr. N. Johnson: All right. 
The Court: Did I miss something in the transcript where she said that? 
I've only read it once. I'm sure you've read it several times. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. She says - - she said that - - in here she says - -
The Court: Show me where she says - - be specific page and line, please. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. So my attorney asked a question, "A judge 
cannot act as an attorney" - -
The Court: Tell me the page, sir, please. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Oh, page 16. 
The Court: Page 16. That's where I am, actually. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Okay, It's down on 22, line 22. 
The Court: Uh-huh. 
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Mr. N. Johnson: And then my attorney that was asking said, "A judge 
cannot act as an attorney for one of the parties." Then the judge said, "So it conies 
down to your interpretation." 
The Court: And the point there - - you have to back up to the top of the 
page as to whether she was acting as an attorney. At the top of the page she 
describes the circumstances dealing with child support. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. 
The Court: And she says starting about page - - line 2, 3 in there - -
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. 
The Court: "If I or one of the other judges or the commissioner see 
something come in on a document prepared by an attorney that we believe is 
wrong then we should do nothing about it?" That's a question to Mr. Lloyd. "And 
if we do something about it we're acting as an attorney for one of the parties?" 
That's a question of Mr. Lloyd. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. 
The Court: And he says, "Well, that's what the adversarial system is set 
up to do, your Honor." 
Mr. N. Johnson: Yeah. 
4 
The Court: And so she is asking the question, "Am I being an attorney." 
He's saying apparently impliedly yes. The judge clearly disagrees. At the bottom 
Mr. Lloyd says, "A judge cannot act as an attorney for one of the parties," and the 
judge says. "So it comes down to your interpretation," which clearly relates back to 
your interpretation of whether I [sic] acted as an attorney. I think that's the crux of 
your issue here whether the judge acted as an attorney and not a judge. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Well, I - -
The Court: I have seen nothing that says she did. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Well, I'm saying - - okay, let's take it this way. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. N. Johnson: The first question that I would want to know is it okay 
for a judge to act as an attorney. 
The Court: And you're asking that in the abstract? 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. 
The Court: My problem is it sounds like an advisory opinion. For the 
sake of argument that is not the judge's role. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. So it's outside jurisdiction. There are other 
things that are outside jurisdiction of the judge. So what we're saying - -
The Court: Well. I beg your pardon. Step back just a second. It could 
even be improper to act in a role but not be outside the jurisdiction and you're 
suing her for doing it. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right, and - -
The Court: No. There's a big difference because immunity shuts down 
your lawsuit for a wrongful act as long as it's within the judicial capacity, and if a 
judge were hypothetically to step over that line and act as an attorney but do it 
within the judicial capacity, that does not make it - - get you around the immunity. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right, and I totally agree. What I'm saying is is [sic] 
I'm saying that in this issue right here - - and we have other things to bring up as 
proof as well, but in this portion of the document that we're showing is is [sic] 
she's saying - - she says, "I can act for an attorney for people that are not part of 
the litigation." 
The Court: But this is where I'm really struggling. She doesn't say that. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Well, that's what she's saying right here she says - -
The Court: That's what I'm asking you to point out. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Well, right here where she's saying, "I can act as" - -
6 
The Court: No. You've got - - if your going to say what she said, you've 
got to say what she said page and line. She doesn't say that in the highlighted 
portion, 
Mr. N. Johnson: Well, what she says is - - where she talks about the 
child support. 
The Court: Which is right at the end of 15, top of 16, right? 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. 
The Court: And she just asks questions of your counsel at that point. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. 
The Court: She doesn't say it. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. She says - - let's see. On page 14. 
The Court: You're at 14. Okay, let me get there. 
Mr. N. Johnson: I - - you said the - - "Excuse me. Let me finish. If I 
see something in the document that I think is clearly wrong or - - say, for instance" 
The Court: Uh-huh. 
Mr. N. Johnson: "I say I [sic] have a pro se divorce that come [sic] 
across my desk every day, and some of them they don't take care of child support, 
7 
which is a statutory obligation." And what I'm saying is she has the right to 
represent [sic] parties that are not part of the case. 
The Court: No, no, she doesn't. She doesn't have the right to represent 
anybody. If she did it would be misconduct. What she says in the next sentence is, 
"Am I acting as someone's attorney if I reject that?" 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. 
The Court: "Because I am looking through it, I see no child support 
award." In fact, she's bound by statute to reject it. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Correct. 
The Court: That's not acting as an attorney, and that's her question to 
your lawyer. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Right. That's what I'm saying, I'm - - that's what I'm 
saying. She's using this as an example to say that, "I have the right to act as an 
attorney for opposing counsel." 
The Court: No, that's the problem, she didn't say she could act as an 
attorney. She's asking if that action would be acting as an attorney. 
Mr. N. Johnson: Correct. 
The Court: In fact, it's a crystal clear example of acting as a judge. 
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Mr. N. Johnson: Correct. 
R. 54, page 10, line 15 to page 15, line 22. 
Argument 
1. The trial court correctly determined that judicial immunity warranted 
dismissal. 
Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for all acts performed in a judicial 
capacity. .See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978). Judicial immunity is 
based in common law. In Christensen v. Ward. 916 F.2d 1462, 1473 (10th Cir. 1990), the 
Tenth Circuit Court stated that "under the common law, judges are absolutely immune 
from suit on any claim based on the conduct of their office, including allegations that a 
decision is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of their judicial authority." The court 
explained that "immunity attaches if (1) the acts complained of are judicial in nature, and 
(2) the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case." Id. Despite the 
Appellant's protestations to the contrary, judicial immunity applies in this case and 
justified the dismissal of the complaint. 
The Appellant does not contest the fact that the trial court had jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the case. R. 54, page 8, lines 12 - 15. The Appellant's contention is that 
the acts complained of were not judicial in nature, which would place the acts outside the 
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scope of jurisdiction. The Stump court stated that, in determining whether an act is 
judicial, the reviewing court looks to the "nature of the act. . . and whether it is nonnally 
performed by a judge." Stump, 435 U.S. at 342. The Sixth Circuit Court cited Stump to 
explain that "[wjhether . . . actions were 'judicial acts' must be answered by looking at 
'the nature' and 'function' of the act, not the act itself.'" Couch v. Lanier. 95 F.3d 438, 
441 (6th Cir. 1996). If the act is one nonnally perfonned by a judge, then immunity 
applies even if the judge erroneously performed the act. 
In deciding this issue, the lower court reviewed the allegations of the Appellant's 
complaint. The lower court detennined that, on the face of the complaint, the acts 
complained of were judicial in nature. R. 42. See also R. 54, page 34, lines 17-25. 
During the hearing, the lower court gave the Appellant a significant amount of time to 
explain why he believed the judge acted outside of her authority. The Appellant was 
unable to satisfy the judge that facts could be alleged placing Judge Laycock's acts 
outside of judicial immunity. 
In his complaint, the Appellant repeatedly referced to the Appellee as "Judge 
Laycock." The Appellant made broad statements such as the judge "acted outside the 
jurisdiction of the court," but the Appellant failed to provide any other facts in the 
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complaint that would suggest that Judge Laycock's actions were outside of her 
jurisdiction or not judicial in nature. 
The Appellant correctly notes that, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the trial 
court was required to accept all alleged facts in the complaint as being true. The 
Appellant then claims that the phrase "acted outside the jurisdiction of the court" is a 
factual statement that the court was required to accept. However, the statement is a legal 
conclusion that is not required to be accepted as true. See Papasan v. Allain. 478 U.S. 
265, 286 (1986) ("Although for purposes of [a] motion to dismiss we must take all the 
factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal 
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.") 
If this statement were accepted as fact, any litigant would be able to hale a judge 
into court to answer a complaint merely by stating the phrase "acted outside of the 
jurisdiction of the court" in the complaint. "Judicial immunity is immunity from suit. . ." 
and not just immunity from liability. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judicial 
immunity does not contemplate a litigant's ability to overcome this bar by reciting a 
simple phrase. 
Importantly, the Appellant has not met his burden to show that the lower court's 
conclusion was incorrect. The Appellant has focused his brief on case law discussing 
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notice pleadings and the liberal construction of complaints, but, other than trying to make 
"acted outside of the jurisdiction" a factual statement, he has not directed this court to 
statements in the complaint that might indicate that the Appellee acted outside of her 
jurisdiction for purposes of judicial immunity. 
2. The trial court provided Appellant with ample opportunity to allege 
additional facts that would place Appellee's acts outside of immunity, but 
Appellant was unable to allege such facts. 
During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court allowed the Appellant 
an extensive opportunity to recite additional facts which might convince the court tb 
allow an amendment of the complaint and further proceedings in the case. The hearing 
focused primarily on the Appellant's argument in his Opposition (R. 22) that the Appellee 
acted as an attorney in preparing a trust deed and trust deed note. A review of the entire 
transcript shows the effort by the trial court to give the Appellant a chance to allege 
sufficient facts. As shown by the portion of the transcript quoted in the above facts, the 
Appellant alleged that the Appellee had admitted to acting as an attorney in the 
proceedings. However, the divorce court transcript did not support this assertion.1 The 
discussion during the hearing included many additional alleged facts. The judge 
expressed a concern that "[w]e may be turning this into a summary judgment." R. 54, page 9, 
lines 5 and 6. The Appellee asserts that this is still a decision on a motion to dismiss. The facts 
alleged at the hearing were elicited by the trial court to determine whether the Appellant would 
be able to allege any facts that would permit the lawsuit. 
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trial court did not accept the Appellant's assertions that these acts would be considered 
outside of the court's judicial authority. The Appellant has not shown that this 
determination was incorrect. 
The trial court also heard allegations from the Appellant that the Appellee 
"prepar[ed] documents for opposing counsel." R. 54, page 27, lines 17, 18. After hearing 
the allegations, the judge was satisfied that all of the allegations concerned judicial acts. 
The trial court recognized that the nature of the judge's action was to "give effect to the 
order." R. 54, page 30. line 21. The trial court stated it was "taking a very strong 
position that it was not outside the jurisdiction of this case or her judicial act." [sic] R. 
54, page 36, lines 21, 22. In other words, the trial court determined that the allegations 
involved functions that are "normally performed by a judge." Stump U.S. at 342. The 
trial court correctly determined that all of the actions discussed by the Appellant during 
the hearing were actions taken by Judge Laycock in her role as a judge. 
3. Other jurisdictions have addressed allegations that a judge gave legal advice 
or acted as counsel. These types of allegations are insufficient to overcome 
judicial immunity. 
In Nelson v. Seitz, 1994 U.S. App LEXIS 7857(9th Cir. 1994) ( copy attached in 
Appendix "C") a plaintiff brought an action against three Oregon Circuit Court judges. 
The plaintiff "alleged that one or more of the defendants ruled contrary to the evidence 
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presented in these proceedings, improperly gave his wife legal advice from the bench, 
refused to enforce a protective order, and issued an invalid restraining order." In 
approving the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated that "all the claims alleged by [plaintiff] against these defendants are based on 
actions taken by the defendant judges in the processing and implementation of petitions 
for restraining orders. Because the judges were resolving disputes between parties or 
authoritatively adjudicating private rights these were judicial acts." Although the plaintiff 
had alleged thai the judges were giving "legal advice," this allegation was not sufficient 
to defeat a motion to dismiss, because the allegations involved a proceeding over which 
the judges presided. 
In a case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a plaintiff alleged that a judge 
improperly gave legal advice and therefore the plaintiffs complaint should survive a 
motion to dismiss. Hosseini v. Sharp, 2006 U.S. App LEXIS 26567 (5th Cir. 2006) (copy 
attached in Appendix "C"). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the judge "spoke with 
[the plaintiff] in his chambers in connection with her brother's interdiction proceedings 
over which the judge was presiding and advised her as to what action could be taken to 
express her objections to the manner in which the interdiction proceedings were being 
handled." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the judge's actions were clearly 
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judicial in nature and did not reflect that [the judge] was acting in the capacity of legal 
counsel for [the plaintiff]." 
These cases indicate that allegations that a judge improperly acted as counsel or 
gave legal advice related to a proceeding over which the judge is presiding are 
insufficient to preclude a dismissal. It is impractical to list all of the potential actions that 
a judge may take concerning a case. A judge is required to resolve disputes, issues orders 
related to those disputes, and issue any subsequent orders that are necessary to enforce the 
judge's original orders. The judge prepares documents, or instructs the attorneys to 
prepare documents, that give effect to the judge's directions. A judge may reject an 
attorney's proposed order, or amend such order to comport with the judge's decision.2 
These are all judicial acts and do not subject a judge to a lawsuit based on those actions. 
4. There are other bases for dismissing the complaint. 
In the motion to dismiss, the Appellee also argued that the complaint violated the 
law of the case doctrine, and the complaint failed to allege a recognizable cause of action. 
R. 15 - 17. Appellee submits that these also support dismissal. See O'Neal v. Division of 
Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1991) ("[W]e wi l l . . . endeavor to uphold a 
2Under Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a judge can even direct a non-party 
to execute a conveyance which a party refuses to execute. 
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trial court's ruling even if we must consider alternative grounds on which the court below 
did not rely.") 
The law of the case doctrine states that "one district court judge may not overrule 
another district judge of equal authority." Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 
1987). The Appellant's complaint sought a decision that would strike "all decisions, 
orders, opinions or rulings" of Appellee. The Appellant was asking a district court judge 
to sit in judgment of Appellee's decisions. The law of the case prohibits this action. 
During the hearing, the trial court judge apparently rejected the law of the case 
doctrine. Rule 54, page 5, lines 1-9. However, this court has recognized the doctrine in a 
case similar to this. In Jenkins v. Payne, 2002 UT App 129 (per curiam) (copy attached in 
Exhibit "C"), an individual filed suit in the Second District Court against an Eighth 
District Court judge. This court upheld the dismissal based on the law of the case 
doctrine. Although the doctrine typically applies when judges successively preside over 
the same case, this court recognized that an individual may not circumvent the traditional 
application of the doctrine by filing an independent action with the purpose of having a 
judge with the same authority issue an order which directly overturns the law of the case 
in the first action. That is the role of an appellate court. 
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The complaint also fails to allege any recognizable cause of action. The Appellant 
seems to assert that acting outside the scope of jurisdiction is a civil cause of action. 
There is no basis for such an assertion. The Appellant also apparently sought a 
declaratory judgment. However, the Appellant failed to allege anything that would 
indicate that he seeks relief under Title 78, Chapter 33, nor does he follow the procedures 
in that chapter. Any attempted declaratory action would also be subject to the same 
defenses of immunity and the law of the case, and perhaps other defenses. 
Conclusion 
Judicial immunity is an important doctrine to protect a judge from repeatedly being 
haled in to court when a litigant disagrees with the judge's decisions. If a litigant 
disagrees with a decision, the litigant may appeal. The Appellant's remedy is to appeal 
Judge Laycock's decisions and actions. The Appellant cannot pursue this civil action 
against Judge Laycock. 
DATED thisiD day of November, 2006 
Brent M. Johnson^ntorney for 
Hon. Claudia Laycock 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is 1o certify that a true and correct copy of the Appellee's Brief was mailed 
first class, postage prepaid and addressed as follows on this of November, 2006. 
Neldon P. Johnson 
326 N. State Road 198 
Salem, Utah 84653 
'VJLMUO HJ 
Diana Pollock 
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APPENDIX "A 
Brent M. Johnson (5495) 
Attorney for Honorable Claudia Laycock 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
P.O.Box 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDON P. JOHNSON ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
HON. CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER 
1 Case No. 060906304 CR 
1 Judge Robert Hilder 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was heard by the court on May 5, 2006. Present at 
the hearing were Neldon P. Johnson, appearing pro se, and Brent M. Johnson, on behalf of 
Defendant Judge Claudia Laycock. The court reviewed the pleadings and received argument. 
The court detennined that Judge Claudia Laycock is entitled to judicial immunity. The court 
determined that Plaintiffs complaint did not contain sufficient allegations indicating that Judge 
Laycock clearly acted outside of her jurisdiction. The court also detennined that Plaintiff would 
not be able to allege facts supporting a claim that Judge Laycock acted outside of her jurisdiction. 
The court therefore determined that the motion to dismiss should be granted, and that Plaintiffs 
complaint should be dismissed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows: 
1. Judge Claudia Laycock is entitled to judicial immunity. 
2. The complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. 
Of* 
-**& (jay Q\ DATED this-**? day of May, 2006 
Jtitfg^ Robert HiM-
V 
^&CT codify 
< ^ A C / ( 1 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a true and conect copy of the foregoing Order was mailed first class, 
postage piepaid and addressed as follows on this of May, 2006. 
Neldon P. Johnson 
326 North Slate Road 198 
Salem, Utah 84653 
•\ P *UKAAHUb> UC" A 
Diana Pollock 
APPENDIX "B 
Neldon P. Johnson, Pro Se 
326 North State Road 198 
Salem, Utah 84653 
IN AND FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Neldon P. Johnson; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Claudia Laycock, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Civil No. 0 b ^ X > 6 ? | ^ 
Judge gflft 
COMES NOW Neldon P. Johnson, appearing pro se. and hereby complains of Defendant as 
follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in Utah County. 
2. Defendant is an individual residing in Utah County. 
3. Plaintiff is a party to the civil dhoice action known as Civil No. 004401468 currently 
pending in the Founh Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah before the 
Honoiable Judge Fred D. Howard ("the Lawsuit"). 
4. During part of the Lawsuit, Judge Claudia Laycock served as the Judge assigned to the 
matter. 
5. During the time that Judge Laycock was assigned to the Lawsuit, Judge Laycock acted 
outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 
6. As a diject result of Judge Lavcock's actions of acting outside the scope of the jurisdiction 
of the Court. Plaintiff has been damaged and his real property has been taken. 
7. During the Lawsuit. Judge Laycock acted in a malicious and prejudicial manner, exceeding 
the scope of the Court's jurisdiction. 
8. As a direct result of Judge Laycock's actions. Plaintiff has suffered damages and his 
constitutional rights of due process have been violated. 
9. AH parties hereto are domiciled in Utah County and the injury alleged herein was caused in 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT CLAUDIA LAVCOCK VIOLATED THE DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS OF NELDON P. JOHNSON) 
10. Plaintiff hereby lefers to and incorporate each and eAery allegation set forth in paragraphs 
one through 9 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
11. Article I. Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states that "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty oi property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
12. As a diject result of Judge Lavcock's unconstitutional acts. Plaintiff has been deprived of 
property without due process. 
13. During the proceedings in the Lawsuit. Claudia Laycock acted in such a malicious and 
pi ejudicial manner and outside the scope of the jui isdiction of the Court that she violated the 
due process rights of Neldon P. Johnson. 
14. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks declarator}7 judgment that the actions of Claudia Laycock during 
the Lawsuit were outside the scope of the Court's jurisdiction and that such actions violated 
the due process rights of Neldon P. Johnson. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INJUNCTIVE RELIEF) 
15. Plaintiff hereby refers to and incorporates each and ever}7 allegation set forth in paragraphs 
one through 12 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
16. Plaintiff has incurred substantial damages and the loss of property without his 
constitutionally protected rights of due process and seeks immediate injunctive relief from 
this Court pending the outcome of these proceedings. 
17. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to have all decisions, orders, and rulings made by Judge Claudia 
Laycock in Civil No. 004401468 suspended until the outcome of this proceeding is fully and 
finally determined by competent judges acting in accordance with the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore Johnson prays for the following relief: 
1. For an opportunity to present evidence and testimony before an impartial judge concerning 
the status of Mr. Johnson's real property. 
2. The right to ha\ e a fair hearing regarding Mr. Jolmson's real property improperly deeded to 
his ex-spouse. 
3. A determination that Claudia Laycock has violated Neldon Jolmson's constitutional rights 
of due process and therefore all decisions, orders, opinions or rulings of Claudia Laycock 
should be stricken and the matters heai d by an impartial judge pursuant lo a fair hearing that 
comports with the principles of due piocess as guaianteed in the Utah Constitution. 
4. And other amounts that the court may deem just. 
DATED this / day of March, 2006. 
Neldon P. Johnson", Pro Se 
Plaintiffs Address: 
326 North State Road 198 
Salem, Utah 84653 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
Lynn Allan Jenkins, 
Plaintiff and Appelant, 
v. 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, 
Honorable David Young Payne, 
Utah State Bar, North Salt Lake City, 
Davis County, and Uintah County, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000956-CA 
F I L E D 
April 25, 2002 
1| 2002UTApp129= l | 
Second District, Farmington Department 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page 
Attorneys: 
Lynn A. Jenkins, Bountiful, Appellant Pro Se 
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee A. Lynn Payne 
Gerald E. Hess, Farmington, for Appellee Davis County 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Greenwood. 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Lynn Allan Jenkins appeals the dismissal of his 1997 complaint filed in the Second District Court 
against the named Defendants. 
Jenkins's brief recites alleged facts relating to a real property dispute that is the subject of a separate lawsuit filed 
in the Eighth District Court for Uintah County (the Uintah County case). The complaint in this case sought orders 
directing (1) adjudication of the Uintah County case by a jury empaneled in the Second District Court for Davis 
bounty; (2) rescheduling of the trial in the Uintah County case; and (3) a jury trial in an unrelated case pending in 
Morth Salt Lake City Court before Judge David Young Payne. The Utah State Bar was dismissed by stipulation. 
Jenkins sought an order compelling Davis County to empanel a jury to determine the facts relating to Jenkins's 
:!aim to real property involved in the Uintah County case. Citing the statutory provisions governing responsibility 
or operation of the district courts, Davis County correctly asserts that the State of Utah has responsibility for 
)peration of district courts and Davis County had no authority to empanef a jury as requested. Accordingly, there 
sre no facts that could be proven to support the requested relief against Davis County and the complaint was 
property dismissed. There is no basis for an award of attorney fees to Jenkins. 
The Second District Court dismissed the complaint against Judge A. Lynn Payne on grounds that (1) each of the 
acts complained of were performed in Judge Payne's judicial capacity and the judge was entitled to absolute 
judicial immunity, and (2) the "law of the case" precludes the Second District Court from overturning the decision 
of the Eighth District Court. Although Jenkins makes the bare allegation that he seeks relief against Judge Payne, 
in his individual capacity, this assertion is wholly unsupported in the record. The acts were clearly "judicial in 
nature," involving rulings in the context of the ongoing judicial proceedings, and Jenkins has not disputed the 
jurisdiction of the courl over the subject matter of the case. See Christensen v. Ward. 916 F.2d 1462,1473 (10th 
Cir. 1990) ("[Ijmmunity attaches if 1) the acts complained of are judicial in nature; and 2) the court had jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the case."). The complaint was therefore properly dismissed. Because "one district 
court cannot overrule another district court judge of equal authority," Mascaro v Davis. 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 
1987), the Second District Court could not schedule a Davis County jury trial in the Uintah County case, and the 
complaint was properly dismissed. 
The court entered the default of Judge David Young Payne on the complaint seeking an order compelling a jury 
trial in a case then pending in the North Salt Lake City Court. However, the Second District Court correctly ruled 
that it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order directing a justice court to schedule a jury trial in the absence of a 
timely appeal taken to district court at the culmination of the justice court proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
5-120 (Supp. 2001). Notwithstanding the default of Judge David Young Payne, the distnct court had no authority 
to order the relief requested in the complaint. Jenkins has included no argument in his brief against the remaining 
county and municipal defendants. Accordingly, we do not consider any claims on appeal based upon Jenkins's 
inadequate briefing. See, e g., In re C.Y., 834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
We affirm the dismissal of the complaint. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26567, * 
PARVIN LALEHPARVARAN HOSSEINI , Plaintiff-Appellant, versus ALVIN R. SHARP, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 06-30021 Conference Calendar 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26567 
October 24, 2006, Filed 
NOTICE: [ * 1 ] RULES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO 
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT. 
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Louisiana. USDC No. 3:05-CV-1485. 
DISPOSIT ION: AFFIRMED. 
COUNSEL: PARVIN LALEHPARVARAN HOSSEINI , Plaintiff - Appellant, Pro se, Ruston, LA. 
For ALVIN R. SHARP, Defendant - Appellee: David Glen Sanders, Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of the Attorney general for the State of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, LA. 
JUDGES: Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. 
OPINION: 
PER CURIAM: * 
Footnotes 
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be 
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. 
R. 47.5.4. 
End Footnotes 
Parvin Lalehparvaran Hosseini appeals the district court's judgment granting defendant 
Sharp's motion to dismiss Hosseini's 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 complaint with prejudice for failure 
to state [ * 2 ] a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Hosseini argues that her 
allegations that Judge Sharp was not acting in a judicial capacity when he gave her legal 
advice were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss based on judicial immunity. She argues 
that the magistrate judge was biased because she and the defendant had once been law 
clerks together and that the district court's disregard for the law indicates that bias. 
Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity from damages in § 1983 actions arising out 
of all acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. Krueger v. Reimer. 66 F.3d 75, 
77 (5th Cir. 19951. Hossein i 's complaint alleged that Judge Sharp spoke with Hossein i in 
his chambers in connection with her brother's interdiction proceedings over which the judge 
was presiding and advised her as to what action could be taken to express her objections to 
the manner in which the interdiction proceedings were being handled. The judge's actions 
were clearly judicial in nature and did not reflect that Judge Sharp was acting in the capacity 
of legal counsel for Hosse in i . The judge's rulings in the interdiction [ * 3 ] proceedings were 
also judicial in nature. Even if the judge's rulings were in error or were the result of a 
malicious intent; Judge Sharp was not deprived of his immunity because the acts were all 
judicial in nature. See Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1996). In light of 
Judge Sharp's entit lement to absolute immunity, the district court did not err in determining 
that Hosse in i ' s complaint failed to state a claim. 
Hosse in i has not made any showing that the magistrate judge's recommendation or the 
district court's dismissal of the complaint were the result of personal bias, See United States 
v. Couch, 896 F 2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1990). 
AFFIRMED. 
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1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7857, * 
DENNIS NELSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOAN G. SEITZ; THOMAS KOLBERG; RONALD 
POOLE, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 93-35732 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7857 
April 5, 1994 * * , Submitted 
* * The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. 
App. P. 34(a) ; 9th Cir. R. 34-4. Accordingly, Nelson's request for oral argument is denied. 
April 14, 1994, Filed 
NOTICE: [ * 1 ] THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT 
BE CITED TO OR BY THE COURTS OF THIS CIRCUIT EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY THE 9TH CIR. 
R. 36-3. 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reported in Table Case Format at: 24 F.3d 248. 1994 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 18810. 
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. 
D.C. No. CV-93-06199-MRH. Michael R. Hogan, District Judge, Presiding 
DISPOSIT ION: AFFIRMED. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff husband challenged the involuntary dismissal of his in 
forma pauperis action against defendants, three Oregon circuit court judges, by the United 
States District Court for the District of Oregon, on the basis of absolute, judicial immunity. 
Plaintiff argued that the judges were not immune from suit where they had ruled contrary 
to the evidence, improperly gave his wife legal advice, and refused to enforce a protective 
order. 
OVERVIEW: Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 civil rights action in forma pauperis, 
complaining about defendants, three Oregon circuit court judges, who had ruled contrary 
to the evidence presented in restraining orders proceedings, improperly gave his wife legal 
advice from the bench, refused to enforce a protective order, and issued an invalid 
restraining order. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's action as frivolous. The court 
aff irmed, holding that under 28 U.S.C.S. 5 1915(d), the district court could dismiss an in 
forma pauperis action as frivolous when it was clear that the judges were immune from 
suit. The court reasoned that plaintiff's claims were based on actions taken by the judges 
in the processing and implementation of petitions for restraining orders. The court 
concluded that the judges were absolutely immune from suit where they were resolving 
disputes between parties or authoritatively adjudicating private rights. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff husband's civil rights 
action as frivolous, holding that defendants, three Oregon circuit court judges, were 
absolutely immune from suit where their complained of conduct involved judicial acts; that 
is, the judges were resolving disputes between parties or authoritatively adjudicating 
private rights. 
CORE TERMS: restraining orders, restraining order, authoritatively, adjudicating, processing, 
resolving, frivolous 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Hide Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Parties > Self-Representation > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion l*iD 
HNi^/\n appellate court reviews the trial court's dismissal of a plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.S. § 
1983 civil rights action for an abuse of discretion. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Counsel > Appointments 
Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers > General Overview 1*J3 
Torts > Public Entity Liability > Immuni ty > Judicial Immunity 
HN2±Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(d), the district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis 
action as frivolous when it is clear that: the defendants are immune from suit. Judges 
have absolute immunity from suits for damages for their judicial acts unless the 
judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. A judicial act is one in which the 
judge is resolving disputes between parties or authoritatively adjudicating private 
rights. A clear absence of all jurisdiction is defined as a "clear lack of all subject 
matter jur isdict ion." A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he 
or she took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his or her 
a u t h o r i t y . More Like This Headnote 
JUDGES; Before: POOLE, BEEZER, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges. 
O P I N I O N : MEMORANDUM * 
Footnotes 
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts 
of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 
End Footnotes-
Dennis R. Nelson appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 civil 
rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1915(d). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
WAfJ7We review the district court's dismissal for an abuse of discretion, Denton v. Hernandez, 
118 L. Ed. 2d 340 f 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992), and we aff irm. 
H/V2
"?Under section [ * 2 ] 1915(d), the district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis action 
as frivolous when it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit. Neitzke v. Will iams, 
490 U.S. 319, 327, 104 L. Fd. 2d 338, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989). Judges have absolute 
immunity f rom suits for damages for their judicial acts unless the judge acted in the clear 
absence of all jurisdict ion. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1389 
(9th Cir. 1987). cert, denied, 486 U.S. 1040 r 100 L. Ed. 2d 616, 108 S. Ct. 2031 (1988). A 
judicial act is one in which the judge is "resolving disputes between parties or . . . 
authoritatively adjudicating private rights." Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.. 124 L. Ed. 2d 
391 , 113 S. Ct. 2167, 2171 (1993) (quotation and citation omit ted). A clear absence of all 
jurisdiction is defined as a "clear lack of all subject matter jurisdict ion" Mullis. 828 F.2d at 
1389, "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he [or she] took [ * 3 ] 
was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his [or her] authority." Stump v. 
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349. 356-57. 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 , 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978). 
Nelson commenced this action against three Oregon Circuit Judges. Nelson alleged that 
defendants violated his civil rights in the processing, issuance, and enforcement of 
restraining orders issued under the Oregon Abuse Prevention Act. See Oregon Rev. Stat. 
107.700-107.730. Nelson alleged that one or more of the defendants ruled contrary to the 
evidence presented in these proceedings, improperly gave his wife legal advice from the 
bench, refused to enforce a protective order, and issued an invalid restraining order. All the 
claims alleged by Nelson against these defendants are based on actions taken by the 
defendant judges in the processing and implementation of petitions for restraining orders. 
Because the judges were "resolving disputes between parties or . . . authoritatively 
adjudicating private rights," see Antoine, 113 S. Ct. at 2171 , these were judicial acts. 
Further, the judges were not acting in the clear [ * 4 ] absence of all jur isdict ion. Under 
Oregon law, "any person who has been the victim of domestic abuse . . . may petition the 
circuit court for relief," Oregon Rev. Stat. 5 107.710, and such relief may include a 
restraining order, Oregon Rev. Stat. 5 107.718. 
Because the defendant judges have absolute judicial immunity f rom Nelson's claims, the 
district court properly dismissed this action as frivolous. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. n l 
Footnotes 
n l In Nelson's response to the Clerk's 9th Cir. R. 34-4 letter, Nelson requested permission to 
add his ex-wife and the Douglas County Shefi f fs Department as new defendants. Because 
this request is raised for the first time on appeal, the request is denied. 
End Footnotes 
AFFIRMED. 
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